A central challenge in the regulation of controlled firms is curbing controller tunneling. As independent directors and fiduciary duties are widely seen as not up to the task, a number of jurisdictions have given minority shareholders veto rights over these transactions. To assess these rights' efficacy, we exploit a 2011 regulatory reform in Israel that gave the minority the ability to veto pay packages of controllers and their relatives ("controller executives"). We find that the reform curbed the pay of controller executives and led some controller executives to quit their jobs or work without pay in circumstances suggesting their pay would not have received approval. These findings suggest that minority veto rights can be an effective corporate governance tool.
Introduction
Most publicly traded firms around the world have a controlling shareholder, also known as a controller (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Holderness, 2009; Gutiérrez and Sáez Lacave, 2018) . In these firms, a key objective of corporate governance is protecting minority shareholders from tunneling via related-party transactions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Enriques and Volpin, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009 ).
The standard tools for constraining controllers-the use of independent directors and the duty of loyalty-are often insufficient. Independent directors are typically appointed and terminated by the controller, making them at least somewhat loyal to her (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 2017; Enriques et al., 2017) . And procedural impediments to shareholder litigation and controller-friendly substantive law can vitiate the legal system's potential deterrent effect (Enriques et al., 2017) .
A potentially more powerful protective tool is subjecting related-party transactions to advance minority approval (Goshen, 2003; Djankov et al., 2008) . This approach, now favored by the OECD (2012), has become the law in Israel, the major Canadian provinces, 1 Australia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and other former members of the Soviet Union. 2 The European Union has also recently considered it. 3 Delaware has adopted a softer version of this approach, which rewards a controller who voluntarily conditions a related-party transaction on minority approval by granting the transaction more deferential 1 Canadian Securities Administrators (2017). 2 OECD (2012), Black and Kraakman (1996) , Enriques and Tröger (2018) , Li (2018) . 3 The European Union considered requiring minority veto rights for conflict transactions, in the end leaving this decision to member states. 4 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, controlled firms with premium listing on the stock exchange can be required to obtain minority approval for transactions with the controller. 5 However, there is scant empirical evidence on whether minority veto rights work. While Delaware has long rewarded controllers for obtaining minority approval, it does not require this approval. A Delaware controller can choose whether to grant the minority a veto right over a transaction, raising significant identification concerns. Even in regimes that require minority approval, substantial empirical challenges remain. First, the controller chooses whether to propose the transaction, creating endogeneity problems. Second, it is difficult to find comparable transactions not subject to minority veto rights. Third, mandatory minority veto rights are a recent regulatory innovation, limiting the size of potential samples.
A 2011 regulatory reform in Israel offers a unique setting for testing the efficacy of minority veto rights. A key element of this reform, known as Amendment No. 16 to the Israeli Companies Law of 1999, 6 was to give minority shareholders of controlled firms veto rights over proposed related-party transactions, including the proposed pay of controllers and their relatives serving as officers or directors ("controller executives"). In particular, their pay packages require approval by a majority of the minority votes cast in a shareholder meeting ("MoM approval") within three years of the last approval. Absent MoM approval, a controller executive can continue to work, but only without pay. Until 2011, pay packages of controller executives had required the approval of only a third of the minority ("ToM approval") and this approval was valid indefinitely, so that a controller executive could continue to draw the same amount of pay even if the minority came to believe that this amount had become excessive. The reform did not alter the approval mechanisms for the pay of executives unrelated to controllers ("non-controller executives"), creating a viable control group. 7 Contemporaneous anecdotal accounts suggest that the reform had real bite. For example, Rami Levy, the controller and CEO of an eponymous supermarket chain, had to cut his bonus in half to secure minority support for his pay contract (Calcalist, October 16, 2011) . According to our calculations, his post-approval package was 26% lower than the previous one. Ilan Ben Dov, the controller of cellular holding company Suny Electronics, forfeited most of his compensation as board chair to win minority shareholder approval of his compensation package (Calcalist, October 16, 2011; Globes, November 14, 2011) . According to our calculations, this led to a pay drop of 83%. Other controllers and their relatives left their executive positions or continued to work without pay due to inability to reach an agreement with the minority on their compensation. At wireless technology firm MTI, the threat of minority veto felled a father-and-son team: MTI's controller and board chair (Zvi Borovitz) and CEO (Zvi's son, Moshe Borovitz) both announced their departure (Globes, December 7, 2011) .
We use the reform to determine whether giving the minority veto rights had a systematic effect on the pay of controller executives by hand-collecting and analyzing data on hundreds of firms and thousands of executives, some related to controllers and others not, over an eight-year period around the reform.
We find that the grant of minority veto rights constrained the pay of controller executives. In particular, controlling for other factors, the full-sample results suggest that the reform is associated with an average decline of 13%-17% in controller-executive pay relative to the expected pay of the same executive based on firm size, profitability and other factors. We also find that this decline is due at least in part to a substantial increase in the frequency of pay cuts for controller executives. Minority shareholders appear to be selective in wielding their veto power, forcing some controller executives to accept massive pay cuts, but not others.
We also examine the reform's effect on the rate at which controller executives disappear from a firm's list of highest paid executives. Such a disappearance means that the controller executive either stops working at the firm or continues working for limited or no pay. We find that the likelihood of controller executives disappearing increased by over 50% after the reform, often in circumstances indicating that the controller executives might have had their pay package vetoed. Managers unrelated to the controller replaced about 10% of the disappearing controller executives, suggesting that the reform affected corporate management. Our direct estimates of the effect of minority veto rights on controller-executive pay are therefore probably downward-biased. 8
Our study does not assess the desirability of the reform because minority veto rights can also thwart value-increasing transactions (Enriques, 2015; Rock, 2018) . In addition, to the extent private benefits motivate controllers to generate value (Burkart et al., 1997; Gilson and Schwartz, 2015) , curbing these benefits can be harmful. Furthermore, impeding controller tunneling through a particular type of related-party transaction can induce controllers to use costlier forms of tunneling. That said, we do not observe a post-reform increase in related-party transactions or a change in dividend policies. 9
Also worth noting is that controller-executive pay may be different from other related-party transactions, making it hard to generalize. Specifically, the cost to the minority of mistakenly vetoing a desirable controller-executive pay arrangement will generally be low because a controller has other incentives to run the firm well. By contrast, the cost to the minority of mistakenly vetoing a desirable commercial or financial arrangement with the controller can be high. The minority may accordingly be more reluctant to veto non-pay related-party transactions, reducing the utility of minority veto rights in non-pay contexts. Despite our inability to assess the overall welfare implications of the reform, our results demonstrate that granting the minority veto rights over a particular transaction makes it more difficult for controllers to extract value through that channel.
Our findings relate to four corporate governance questions.
First, we shed light on the potential use of minority veto rights to constrain tunneling through related-party transactions. Because the requirement of minority approval in related-party transactions is relatively recent, almost all prior work relating to minority veto rights concerns controllers who voluntarily grant the minority veto rights in Delaware freezeouts to reduce judicial scrutiny of the transaction (Subramanian, 2007; Restrepo, 2013; Restrepo and Subramanian, 2015) . However, it is impossible to determine empirically the effect of minority veto rights in this setting, as both the timing of the freezeout proposal and the decision to grant the minority veto rights are endogenous, and the grant of minority veto rights changes the legal treatment of the transaction. The advantage of our study is that it examines a largely exogenous event: we study mandatory minority approval of existing related-party transactions by a state-imposed deadline. In addition, the availability of pay data for noncontroller executives, combined with executive fixed effects, enables us to construct robust controls. In contemporaneous work, Li (2018) finds that minority-shareholder veto rights on related-party transactions in India reduce minority shareholder expropriation. 10 Consistently, Lin (2018) reports that activist shareholders use minority veto rights to leverage their positions in Hong Kong controlled firms. 10 Chen et al. (2013) study the effect of a Chinese regulation requiring advance minority approval for stock issuances, transactions that often facilitate tunneling (Fried, 2018; Fried and Spamann, 2018) . Chen et al. (2013) find that mean cumulative abnormal stock returns associated with stock issuances are negative before and positive after the regulation, suggesting that minority veto rights improve the quality of stock issuances. Their study does not include controls in the form of stock issuances unaffected by the reform.
Second, our findings contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of shareholder voting generally, including in widely held firms. Shareholders typically have veto rights over fundamental corporate actions like charter amendments and mergers. In addition, depending on the jurisdiction and the firm, shareholders may have veto rights over corporate actions like equity issuances (Yermack, 2010; Holderness, 2018) , acquisitions (Kamar, 2006; Becht et al., 2016) , equity compensation plans (Armstrong et al., 2013) , or extraordinary transactions involving directors (Enriques et al., 2017) .
The protection that these veto rights afford is difficult to measure becauseoutside the say-on-pay (SoP) context, where periodic votes are mandated-firms typically put proposals to shareholder vote only when expecting approval, possibly after negotiating with institutional investors (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998) . This endogeneity makes it difficult to infer from voting outcomes whether a shareholder vote affects transaction outcomes, as the outcome that would occur absent a vote is unknown. By contrast, our setting features largely exogenously timed votes, permitting us to test whether shareholders use their voting power to constrain insiders.
Third, we contribute to the line of research investigating tunneling through pay. While pay is not the most lucrative channel for tunneling, as it is salient and often small relative to firm value, pay is readily accessible because controllers and their relatives often work for the firm and it is accepted that they should be paid. Prior work has therefore sought to determine whether pay tunneling occurs by comparing the pay of controller executives to that of non-controller executives. This work has found pay tunneling in some jurisdictions-including Italy (Bozzi et al., 2017) , Chile (Urzua, 2009) , and Israel (Barak et al., 2011) -but not in others-including Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003) and Continental Europe generally (Croci et al., 2012) .
Our setting enables us to test for the presence of pay tunneling more directly by examining the effect on pay of a reform that, in midstream, introduced arm'slength bargaining between the minority and the controller. Even before the reform, there was a constraint on pay tunneling, as controller executives needed ToM approval to obtain pay increases. However, the reform substantially tightened the constraint, as all controller-executive pay arrangements now needed MoM approval every three years. Our findings, that the reform increased the likelihood of pay reductions for controller executives, constrained controllerexecutive pay, and caused some controller executives to quit, suggest that the minority perceived some controller executives as overpaid-although it is possible that the minority penalized these controller executives for reasons unconnected to tunneling.
Finally, our findings contribute to the extensive literature on the effect of SoP votes on executive pay levels and structure. In the United Kingdom, nonbinding SoP has caused certain shareholder-favored changes in the structure of executive pay (Ferri and Maber, 2013; Gregory-Smith et al., 2014) . By contrast, in the United States, nonbinding SoP has had little effect on pay (Ertimur et al., 2011; Brunarski et al., 2015; Cuñat et al., 2016; Iliev and Vitanova, 2018) . 11 Using a large multi-jurisdiction sample of firms, Correa and Lel (2016) find that SoP restrains the growth of executive pay and increases the sensitivity of pay to performance, primarily in regimes with nonbinding SoP. However, in all jurisdictions studied to date, SoP requires a simple majority, guaranteeing approval in controlled firms. Our study is the first to examine the effect of binding SoP requiring MoM support, and shows that binding SoP can not only restrain executive pay but also cause executives to step down or work without pay.
The remainder of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the data and our empirical approach. Section 3 describes our main empirical results. Section 4 presents several extensions and robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.
Methodology and data
Our analysis focuses on a 2011 Israeli reform of the regulation of public firms. Prior to 2011, related-party transactions-including pay packages of controller executives-had to receive approval by a third of the minority (ToM) once for the 11 Other work related to SoP in the United States examines the effects on stock prices of nonbinding shareholder proposals to adopt nonbinding SoP (before the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandated nonbinding SoP) and the adoption of regulation increasing shareholder influence over pay (Cai and Walking, 2011; Larcker et al., 2013) . duration of the transaction. 12 The reform raised the threshold to a majority of the minority (MoM) and, importantly, required long-term transactions to receive new approval every three years. The reform thus gave the minority real veto rights: the ability to deny a controller executive any pay going forward.
We study the effect of these veto rights on the pay of controller executives using hand-collected data on executive compensation for firms listed on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange in the years 2008-2015. We exclude financial firms (for which measures of performance are different), dual-listed firms (which did not report individual executive compensation until 2014), firms with public debt but no public equity (which are not subject to minority veto rights) and exchangelisted oil explorations partnerships. Our sample, an unbalanced panel described in Panel A of Table 1 , consists of 554 firms, of which 30% are in manufacturing, 27% are in services and 23% are in real estate.
Like Delaware law, Israeli law defines a shareholder (or a group of affiliated shareholders) as a controller if she can direct the firm's actions. For purposes of the requirement to obtain minority shareholder approval of controller transactions, including executive pay, Israeli law presumes that a 25% shareholder is a controller unless another shareholder holds 50% of the shares. Virtually all firms in our sample have a controller. Table 1 also presents accounting data on firm size and profitability obtained from the commercial provider A-Online. Firm size, measured by total assets, varies considerably across firms, with a mean that is much higher than the median. Accordingly, we control for the natural logarithm of total assets. As is standard in the executive compensation literature (for example, Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005) , operating profitability is measured by return on assets (ROA). 13 In our sample, ROA averages about zero, with a median of 2.5%, indicating the presence of many poorly performing firms. In fact, ROA is negative in about 30% 12 Hamdani and Yafeh (2013) describe the voting rules and practices before the reform. 13 In many specifications, we use ROA together with individual or firm fixed effects, capturing changes in profitability relative to the firm-specific mean ROA over time. The results reported below remain qualitatively unchanged in unreported regressions using lagged profitability and market-to-book ratio instead of ROA. of the observations. Accordingly, we control for ROA and in some specifications also use a dummy variable to denote negative profitability.
Panel A of
Israel requires the types of firms in our sample to disclose the compensation of individual executives (like the United States in its regulation of domestic public firms). In particular, these firms must report the individual annual compensation of the five highest paid executives in the firm and its subsidiaries, each of the three highest paid executives in the firm itself, and any holder of at least 5% of the shares (if paid by the firm). The precise definition of covered executives and the possibility of mid-year turnover mean that firms sometimes report the pay of fewer or more than five executives. For each firm, we obtain from annual reports and proxy statements the names, positions, compensation packages, and pay approvals of reported executives, typically including both controller executives and non-controller executives. 14 In our sample, the median number of reported executives is five (the mean is slightly higher; Panel A of Table 1 ). More than 40% of all firms report the compensation of exactly five executives, making five the modal number of reported executives. Another 30% of the firms report the compensation of six or seven executives, 10% of the firms report the compensation of eight to ten executives, and another 10% report the compensation of three to four executives.
While virtually all firms in the sample have a controller, only about 60% of the firms report at least one controller executive. The median and mode of the number of controller executives per firm is one, and the mean is 1.3 (Panel A of Table 1), with 63% of controller executives serving as board chair or CEO. In one of the robustness tests described below, we exclude firms with no reported controller executives, obtaining similar results to those of the main specifications. Table 1 presents the executive compensation data, consisting of about 16,880 observations of about 4,900 executives during the period 2008-2015. Controller executives comprise about a fifth of the executives in the sample. However, because their turnover is lower than that of other executives, they comprise about a quarter of the observations. The average level of total compensation of an executive in the sample is about NIS 1.38 million (about $345,000) and the median is about NIS 850,000 (approximately $215,000), with controller executives earning on average about NIS 1.6 million-15% above the full sample average. Some controller executives are relatives of the controller who occupy less senior positions and bring down the average.
Panel B of
As expected, equity compensation is more common in compensation packages of non-controller executives. Non-equity compensation (total compensation minus equity-based pay) accounts, on average, for 88% of total compensation in the full sample and for 95% of total compensation of controller executives. Although controller executives are less likely to receive equity-based pay, they typically hold much larger equity stakes than non-controller executives: 23% on average (with a median of 15%), compared to 0.4% on average (with a median of 0%) for non-controller executives. Here too, some of the controller executives are relatives of the controller, bringing down the group average. 15 Table 1 presents compensation approvals by type and year. There are 310 pre-reform ToM approvals and 773 post-reform MoM approvals. MoM approvals appear to occur in two rounds. The first round starts in 2011, when the new law became effective. The second round starts in 2014, when the MoM approvals obtained in 2011 expired. In an extension of our analysis, we distinguish between the two MoM approval rounds. Table 1 also presents the distribution over time of compensation approvals for non-controller executives. These approvals include board approvals for the compensation of officers and shareholder approvals by a simple 15 A recent Bank of Israel internal memorandum reports very similar figures for the entire population of listed firms in Israel around the same period. Within the controller group (controller plus related parties), the average blockholder holds 23.3% of the equity; firms have 2.74 blockholders, on average, holding together about 64% of the equity. Because our focus in the present study is on the effect of the 2011 reform on the compensation of controller executives, where equity-based pay is not a major feature, we do not examine further the structure of compensation contracts. majority for the compensation of board members. 16 Both allow a controller to increase the pay of non-controller executives even if the minority objects. We use this information to compare the effect of different approval types on the likelihood of a compensation reduction.
Panel C of

Finally, Panel D of Table 1 reports the numbers of controller-and noncontroller executives disappearing from their firm's list of highest paid executives each year. Casual observation suggests that the number of disappearing controller executives is higher in the post-reform period. We examine these data in more detail below.
We divide our main empirical tests into three parts. In the first part of our analysis, we use a difference-in-difference model to estimate the post-reform change in the compensation levels of controller executives. In essence, we compare the post-reform change in compensation of controller executives, whom the reform affected directly, with the post-reform change in compensation of non-controller executives in the same firm, whom the reform did not affect directly. For example, this can be a comparison between the change in compensation of a controller who serves as board chair and the change in compensation of a hired CEO at the same firm.
Ideally, the control group in an analysis of this type should be entirely unaffected by the reform. In our setting, this assumption may be violated if the compensation of non-controller executives is linked to that of the most senior executive in the firm-and that senior executive is a controller executive. 17 However, if such linkage exists between the compensation of non-controller executives and the compensation of controller executives, it would only bias our estimates against finding pay differences post-reform between controller executives and non-controller executives. 18 Our estimates would then be conservative.
In the second part of the analysis, we explore one mechanism by which the reform affected controller-executive pay levels: the minority shareholders' use of their veto right to force controller executives to take pay cuts. 19 In the third part of the analysis, we examine the extent to which the reform caused controller executives to disappear from the firm's list of highest paid employees and the likelihood that a hired professional manager replace a disappearing controller executive.
Finally, towards the end of the paper, we extend the core three parts of the analysis and present a variety of additional results and robustness tests.
Main results
The reform's effect on controller-executive pay level
We begin by examining whether the reform affected the pay levels of controller executives. We use a standard difference-in-differences specification:
where i, j and t denote the individual executive, the firm and the year, respectively. Controller Executive*Post Reform is a dummy for a controller executive (the treated group) in the year 2011 or later; the dummy for a 18 Our estimates would have a downward bias also if controller executives anticipated the reform and rushed to obtain ToM approvals ahead of the change, spurring pay increases prereform and postponing pay reductions by three years post-reform. However, Panel C of Table 1 does not reveal such a rush. This stands to reason. First, controller executives who could obtain pay increase before the reform would have presumably done so independent of the reform. Second, while a possible reform had been in discussion for several years, its timing and content evolved over a lengthy legislation process. 19 Minority veto rights can also keep pay from increasing. controller executive prior to the reform is subsumed by individual executive fixed effects. 20 Executive fixed effects capture (among other things) each executive's average level of compensation over time. Firm-level controls and year fixed effects capture other determinants of pay.
Our main dependent variable in this part of the analysis is the natural logarithm of total compensation of an individual executive i in the year t, a variable commonly used in the executive compensation literature (for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005) . For accounting reasons, firms may report equity-based pay after the grant year, potentially distorting our pay measure. To address this, some specifications use total compensation minus equity-based pay. We also examine an alternative regression specification in which the dependent variable is the ratio of each executive's pay to the reported aggregate pay to all of the firm's top executives. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011) , we refer to this measure of relative pay as the "pay slice". Table 2 presents the results for the full sample, except for Columns 2 and 6, which present results for a more homogenous subsample of the two highest paid executives in each firm and year. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation. In Columns 3 and 7, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of non-equity compensation; and in Columns 4 and 8 the dependent variable is the "pay slice". In Columns 1 through 4 we control only for executive-and year fixed effects. Columns 4 through 8 include, in addition, commonly used controls for firm size and ROA. We also control for whether the firm employs the executive for less than a full year or only part-time (Partial Employment). 21 We cluster standard errors by firm and year.
The coefficients of the interaction term Controller Executive*Post Reform in Table 2 indicate the existence of a negative effect of the reform on the compensation of the treated group-controller executives. Although absolute compensation levels for executives in aggregate do not materially change during the sample period, the effect of the post-reform period on controller-executive pay levels implies that controller executives earn 13%-17% less in 2011-2015 than they would have earned absent the reform. 22 Importantly, this is an average effect. Many controller executives (including the ones named in the Introduction) saw their pay fall by substantial amounts, with some experiencing pay cuts of over 50%. Conditional on pay reduction, nearly a quarter of controller executives saw their pay fall by at least 30%. Consistent with the previous results, Columns 4 and 8 show that the pay slice of controller executives (averaging about 19% in the years 2008-2010) declines by about one percentage point (about 5%) in the years 2011-2015. This decline is statistically significant.
The reform's effect on the likelihood of pay reductions
We study the mechanism by which the reform may have affected the pay of controller executives by examining the likelihood of pay reductions. Table 3 presents several regression specifications in which the dependent variable indicates whether total compensation or non-equity compensation is lower than in the preceding year. We use logit and linear probability models with and without executive fixed effects for the full sample and for a subsample of the two months or less than full time. This variable, which equals one in about 25% of the observations, varies over time for some executives and thus can be included in the regressions. In robustness regressions reported below, we exclude executives working part time and obtain similar results. While our sample does not contain other executive-specific variables (such as age or education), the individual fixed effects largely capture their effects. 22 The estimates are smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant when the sample is restricted to the two highest paid executives. The results in the main specification of Column 5 are unchanged when we replace the post-reform dummy, which takes the value one starting in 2011 for all executives, by an individual post-reform dummy, which takes the value one after the MoM deadline of each controller executive. The results remain qualitatively unchanged also when we use other measures of firm performance, such as market-to-book ratio or lagged ROA. Note that the regressions include of (thousands of) executive-specific fixed effects results in high values of R-squared. highest paid executives. The results are consistent across the various specifications.
In general, approvals of pay packages are associated with compensation increases across executives: the coefficient of Any Approval is negative and statistically significant (that is, negatively correlated with the probability of a compensation reduction). This is not surprising. First, over half of all approvals in our sample involve pay packages of non-controller executives. These pay packages are not subject to minority approval and thus depend solely on the controller. A controller or a board carrying out a controller's will and wishing to retain an executive is more likely to raise pay than to cut it. Second, many of the remaining approvals are pre-reform ToM approvals of controller executives' pay packages. A controller is likely to seek these approvals only when planning to raise the pay and expecting to obtain approval. Accordingly, the coefficient of ToM Approval is not statistically different from that of Any Approval.
MoM approvals are economically and statistically different from all other approvals in not being associated with compensation increases: the sum of the coefficients of Any Approval and MoM Approval is close to zero. This is because many MoM approvals are associated with compensation reductions. Specifically, of the 773 MoM approvals in our sample, 280 (36%) are associated with a reduction in total pay; the comparable figure for other approval types is nearly 50% smaller. Similarly, 36% of MoM approvals are associated with a reduction in non-equity compensation, compared to 17% of other approvals. Figure 1 shows that MoM approvals are far more likely to result in reductions of non-equity pay than other approval types. The same holds for reductions in total compensation. We seek to explore why the reform affected certain controller executives more than others. In all specifications in Table 3 but one, we observe a negative and statistically significant relation between ROA and the likelihood of pay reduction. In unreported regressions, we find an even stronger negative relation between ROA and the likelihood of pay reduction of at least 25%. 23 However, 23 The results in Table 3 remain qualitatively unchanged when we use other measures of firm performance, such as lagged ROA or market-to-book ratio. In unreported regressions, we also define dummy variables corresponding to ROA levels: one for negative ROA, another for positivebut-below-median ROA, and a third for above-median ROA. We find that negative ROA and unlike Fisch et al. (2018) , we do not find that the effect of MoM approval on the likelihood of pay reduction varies with firm performance or excess pay, defined as the residual from a regression of pay on firm size, industry and profitability. This suggests that minority shareholders use other indicators to determine whether a controller executive's pay is excessive.
We conclude that the requirement of MoM approval has real bite. Before their introduction in 2011, the alternative to seeking ToM approval for a raise was to keep a controller-executive's compensation unchanged. Starting in 2011, the option of continuing at the existing level of pay indefinitely is no longer available. The firm now has to seek MoM approval within three years of the previous approval, which can result in a pay cut if the minority perceives the controller executive as overpaid.
The reform's effect on controller-executive disappearances
As discussed above, contemporaneous anecdotal accounts indicate that, after the reform, certain controller executives quit or remained in office with no pay when they were unable to obtain MoM approval. These effects do not show up in our measure of controller-executive pay, which we based on the reported pay of executives who continue to appear on the list of the firm's highest paid employees, causing any observed decline to understate the reform's true impact on controller-executive pay levels and firm governance generally.
To investigate this effect, we identify all executives whose pay no longer appears in the firm's annual report, even though the firm remains in the sample and continues to report the pay of other executives. These executives disappear from their firm's list of highest paid executives because they no longer hold a senior position in the firm or because they continue to hold the same or other position but at a low pay or no pay at all. Consistent with contemporaneous media reports, we find that the reform sharply increased the disappearance rate for controller executives. We also find that this effect correlates with failure to obtain MoM approval.
We begin by observing that controller executives are less likely to disappear than are non-controller executives during the entire sample period. While controller executives constitute about 25% of our sample, they constitute only 12% of disappearances. However, the disappearance rate for controller executives increases significantly after the reform. Between 2008 and 2009 and between 2009 and 2010, about 6% of controller executives disappeared each year. In the post-reform period, the corresponding annual figures are 9% to 12%, an increase of about 50%. There is no similar trend for non-controller executives. Figure 2 presents this change: the disappearance rate of controller executives increases in the post-reform period, whereas that of non-controller executives does not (upper panel). As a result, the frequency controller executive disappearance increases relative to the frequency of disappearance of noncontroller executives (lower panel).
In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 , we corroborate this result by running logit regressions estimating the coefficients of several determinants of the probability of disappearance. We find that this probability increases for controller executives after the reform. Moreover, Column 3 of Table 4 shows that the likelihood of controller executive disappearance increases after a MoM approval deadline. In particular, it is failure to meet the deadline that correlates with disappearance: Column 4 indicates that the likelihood of disappearance falls after obtaining MoM approval. 24 We read corporate filings to examine if hired professionals replaced disappearing controller executives. Before the reform, this was virtually unheard of. After the reform, it occurred in about 10% of controller-executive disappearances (roughly 30 out of about 300). 25 This appears to be a real, if 24 This result holds also when using a linear probability regression. 25 The figures are approximate because the fate of some disappearing controller executives is unclear. It appears that around 30 controller executives ceased to hold their positions for reasons unrelated to control changes and the person who replaced them was unrelated to the controller. modest, effect of the reform on corporate management (we examine additional effects in Section 4). In addition, after the reform, about 50 controller executives remained in office but were no longer on the list of top paid executives because they worked for little or no pay. 26 In sum, the reform not only restrained the pay of controller executives whose pay continued to be reported, but also drove the pay of other controller executives below reported levels, often to zero. It also prompted a modest shift in the staffing of management positions, from controllers to hired professionals. Our estimates of the reform's effect on controller-executive pay therefore understate the reform's full effect on firms. 27
Extensions and Robustness Tests
Results for sub-periods: first-round vs. second-round MoM approvals
The reform required controller executives to obtain MoM approval for their pay within three years of the last approval. The first approval deadline thus took place in the period 2011-2013, depending on the executive's last pay approval date, with over half of controller executives in office in 2011 having their initial MoM deadline in 2011. The second MoM approval deadline came three years later, in the period 2014-2016.
To examine the long-term effects of the reform, we distinguish in Table 5 between the first round of MoM approvals, in 2011-2013 (63% of the sample), and the second round of MoM approvals, in 2014-2015 (37% of the sample). It appears that second-round MoM approvals are less likely to be associated with 26 Here too the figures are approximate.
Other reasons for controller-executive disappearance include replacement by different controller executives, control changes, and court ordered receivership. 27 Ra and Kim (2018) discuss a related phenomenon in Korea, where a mandatory pay disclosure rule applies to board members whose compensation levels exceed a certain level. They report that board members attempt to evade the rules and disappear through pay cuts or by relinquishing their formal positions. compensation reductions than first-round MoM approvals, although this difference is not statistically significant. 28 One interpretation of the lower likelihood of pay reductions in second-round MoM approvals is that the first round of MoM approvals adjusted the pay of controller executives as much as minority shareholders wanted, allowing firms to revert to normal raises at the time of second-round MoM approvals. Another interpretation is that firms had more time to prepare for the second round of MoM approvals and chose opportune moments to hold them. 29
Results for subsamples
In Table 6 , we repeat the benchmark regression specification from Column 5 of Table 2 for several subsamples.
In Column 1, we exclude firms without controller executives on the list of highest paid executives. These firms help us to estimate the effects of the control variables more precisely, but do not contribute to the estimation of the postreform change in controller-executive pay. These firms may also be different from firms with controller executives on the list of highest paid executives. The results are similar to those in Column 5 of Table 2 .
In Column 2, we include only firms with a controller executive whose MoM approval deadline is in 2011 to estimate the effect of the reform on controller executives that could not plan for it. In this, much smaller subsample, the effect 28 While the difference between the coefficient of first-round approvals and the coefficient of second-round approvals is not statistically significant in any regression, in all regressions the coefficient of first-round approvals is larger and more statistically significant. However, the coefficients on first-round approvals are not larger than the coefficients on second-round approvals in logit regressions with no executive fixed effects; therefore, our conclusions in this section remain tentative. 29 In unreported regressions, we distinguish between MoM approvals obtained at a date before the calendar year of the deadline stipulated by law and MoM approvals obtained in the calendar year of the legal deadline or later. We examine if controller executives facing an approval deadline (perhaps because they did not expect to win approval earlier in the cycle) are more likely to take a pay cut than controller executives who seek approval earlier in the cycle. The differences, however, are economically and statistically insignificant. of the reform on the compensation of controller executives is much larger than in the full sample: about -20% versus about -13% in Column 5 of Table 2. 30 In Column 3, we exclude executives who disappear from the sample before its last year. In Column 4, we also exclude executives who appear in the sample only after its initial year. In Column 5, we exclude executives employed part-time. In these three specifications, the effect of the post-reform years on the compensation of controller executives remains.
In unreported regressions, we exclude parents and their subsidiaries from the sample. The reason is that compensation figures in the reports of parents include compensation paid by subsidiaries, even if the subsidiaries are public and report it in their own filings. This can distort our analysis of the relation between compensation, approvals, and performance. The results of Table 2 remain unchanged in this subsample.
Additional effects of the reform on firm behavior
We explore possible effects of the reform on other aspects of corporate behavior.
First, we examine if other types of related-party transactions replaced executive pay as a way for controllers to extract rent. We do not believe such a shift is likely because the reform subjected all related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business to the same MoM approval requirement as executive pay. After the reform, the value of non-pay related-party transactions normalized by firm assets declines for the 108 firms in our sample with available data (non-financial firms among the largest 150 firms on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) by slightly more than 50%. The decline is similar (slightly less than 50%) for firms in which a controller executive experienced a pay decrease post-reform. It is possible that controller-executive pay and non-pay related-party transactions are complements, rather than substitutes, but the available data are not enough to draw firm conclusions.
Second, we examine if an increase in dividend payout replaces executive pay as a way of controllers to benefit from the firm. Such a shift is also unlikely because, contrary to executive compensation, dividends are payable to all shareholders and are thus costly to controllers. Accordingly, in unreported regressions we find that the ratio of dividends to profits (or other measures of dividends normalized by firm size) remains roughly constant post-reform and that firms with controller-executive pay reductions are not different from other firms.
Finally, we also do not detect significant changes in Tobin's Q following the reform or following compensation reductions. This is perhaps not surprising given the modest magnitude of compensation reductions and the fact that the managerial incentives of controller executives are due primarily to their shareholdings.
Conclusion
To protect minority shareholders from tunneling by controllers, a number of jurisdictions have introduced reforms designed to give the minority veto rights over related-party transactions. We test the effect of this right by exploiting a 2011 Israeli reform that gave minority shareholders, in midstream, the ability to veto the pay of controller executives.
We find that this veto right constrains the pay of controller executives, in part by increasing the frequency of pay reductions. The threat of minority veto also induces some controller executives to relinquish their positions or continue to work without pay. Following the reform, the rate at which controller executives disappear from their firm's highest paid executives list increases by about 50%. The estimated effect of the reform on controller-executive pay thus understates its actual effect.
Our work contributes to a better understanding of controller-pay tunneling. We find that the grant of a minority veto constrains controller-executive pay levels, leads to more pay reductions and to the disappearance of certain controller executives from the firm's list of highest paid executives, suggesting that pre-reform minority shareholders considered some controller executives to be overpaid. This paper also provides a unique setting for identifying the power of minority veto rights for policing related-party transactions more generally. Unlike other settings, where the controller chooses whether to give the minority a veto right (as in Delaware) or the veto right is mandatory but the controller can choose whether and when to propose a transaction (as in Canada), our setting raises minimal endogeneity concerns. The reason is that the Israeli reform makes the veto right mandatory and sets forth an exogenous deadline for obtaining minority approval.
Our work also contributes to the literature on SoP by showing that a mandatory vote can have an effect both on the level of executive pay and on whether executives remain in their jobs. This may be relevant to policymakers in many jurisdictions given the ubiquity of shareholder voting schemes around the world. MoM Approvals ToM Approvals Other Approvals
Figure 2: Disappearance Rates of Controller-and Non-Controller Executives
A disappearing executive is an executive who no longer appears on the firm's list of highest paid executives after the current year. The last year in the sample appears on the horizontal axis. The disappearance rate is the likelihood that a particular type of executive (controller or non-controller) will disappear. The top figure compares the disappearance rate each year with the pre-reform disappearance rate (the average of the 2008 and 2009 disappearance rates, normalized at 100). The bottom figure compares the disappearance rates of controller-and non-controller executives. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 4,922 executives from 554 Israeli public firms in the years 2008-2015. In Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of annual total compensation. In Columns 3 and 7, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of non-equity compensation (omitting observations in which the entire compensation package is equity based). In Columns 4 and 8, the dependent variable is the "pay slice" (the share of the executive's total pay to that of all reported executives in the firm/year), omitting the lowest paid executive reported in each firm/year so that the slices do not add up to one. All specifications include executive-and year fixed effects. All columns report results for the full sample, except Columns 2 and 6, which report the results for a subsample of the two highest paid executives in each firm. Controller Executive*Post Reform equals one for controller executives starting in 2011 and zero otherwise. Partial Employment equals one for executives employed less than a full year or less than full time and zero otherwise. We multiply the coefficient of ROA by 100. All control variables are from the same year as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm and year, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) Logit (1) (2) (3) Column 1 presents results for the entire truncated sample. Column 2 presents results for a subsample of the two highest paid executives. Column 3 presents full-sample results of a regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if non-equity pay declines relative to the previous year, and zero otherwise. MoM Approval*2011-2013 and MoM Approval*2014-2015 equal one if a MoM approval occurs in the year and the year is in 2011-2013 or 2014-2015, respectively, and zero otherwise. Any Approval is a dummy variable that equals one if there is any pay approval for the executive in the year, and zero otherwise. ToM Approval is a similarly defined dummy variable that equals one if a ToM approval occurs in the year, and zero otherwise. Log (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in NIS. We multiply the coefficient of ROA by 100. Negative ROA and Partial Employment are dummy variables denoting negative ROA and partial employment (less than full-time or less than a full year). All control variables are from the same year as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm and year, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
(1) (2) This table repeats the benchmark regressions from Column 4 of Table 2 for several subsamples. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total compensation. In Column 1, we include only firms with at least one controller executive on the list of highest paid executives. In Column 2, we include only firms with controller executives whose MoM approval deadline is in 2011.
In Column 3, we include only executives who remain in office until the end of the sample period. In Column 4, we include only executives who are in office for the entire sample period. In Column 5, we exclude executives with Partial Employment. Controller Executive*Post Reform equals one for controller executives starting in 2011, and zero otherwise. Partial Employment equals one for executives employed less than a full year or less than full time, and zero otherwise. We multiply the coefficient of ROA by 100. All control variables are from the same year as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors, clustered by firm and year, are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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